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Abstract: Scholars often assume that as a global superpower, the United 
States has had great influence and impact on political regime develop-
ments in the world. This article critically examines these claims, focusing 
on Latin America; by investigating the region most directly dominated by 
the US, it employs a most-likely-case design. The experiences of coun-
tries such as Brazil, Chile, Haiti, Nicaragua, and Venezuela show that US 
influence has been fairly limited for many years and has diminished over 
time. The Northern superpower has been less involved and has had less 
impact on regime developments than often postulated, as the analysis of 
the coups in Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973 demonstrates. Moreover, 
nations to which the US has maintained close, comprehensive linkages, 
such as Venezuela, have slid into “competitive authoritarianism” while a 
country such as Haiti, over which the US holds great leverage, has failed 
to establish a functioning democracy. Thus, even in its direct sphere of 
interest, the most powerful nation in the contemporary world seems to 
be limited in its capacity to promote or prevent political regime change. 
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+RZ3RZHUIXO$UH*UHDW3RZHUV"
Can great powers induce weaker nations to effect political regime 
change, and successfully forestall regime changes that they oppose? Sev-
eral scholars have recently answered these questions in the affirmative. 
For instance, Boix (2011), Narizny (2012), and Gunitsky (2017) argued 
that the rise and fall of hegemonic powers has considerable influence on 
the advance of democracy in the world, or its reversal. Similarly, Levitsky 
and Way (2010) attributed significant effects to the linkages with and 
leverage of Western countries, among which the United States has the 
greatest weight. This impact can arise from a variety of mechanisms, 
ranging from military imposition – as in Austria, Germany, Italy, and 
Japan after the Second World War, to targeted economic incentives and 
the inspiration eradiating from success in global power struggles (Gun-
itsky 2017). 
The present article assesses these interesting claims by analyzing the 
United States’ role in Latin America. The predominance that the North-
ern colossus established from the Spanish–American War (1898) onward 
is the prime example of hegemony by a liberal-democratic country. 
Washington’s advantage in economic, political, and military resources 
has been considerable. During the first third of the twentieth century, the 
US in fact intervened frequently, especially in the circum-Caribbean. For 
various reasons, Washington sent the Marines into Cuba, the Dominican 
Republic, Haiti, Mexico, and Nicaragua (Gil 1971: chaps. 4–5). 
Given this predominance, US relations with Latin America should 
provide “most likely cases” (cf. Gerring 2007: 115–122) for corroborat-
ing theories about the capacity of great powers to promote political re-
gime change in weaker countries. Some prominent scholars of US–Latin 
American relations have embraced this line of reasoning. For instance, 
Kornbluh (2003, 2014) and McSherry (2005) have argued that the US 
had significant involvement in regime developments on the Southern 
continent, including the wave of military coups during the 1960s and 
1970s. 
However, the available evidence suggests more skeptical conclu-
sions (for a broadly similar view, see Brands 2010). It seems that US 
influence has always been limited. Moreover, this influence declined 
considerably over the course of the twentieth century; in the new millen-
nium, it clearly does not amount to hegemony. Interestingly, the acceler-
ating declassification of documents has strengthened these arguments. 
Growing transparency has revealed few “smoking guns” of direct, deci-
sive US involvement; in fact, newly declassified documents often show 
the limits of US intervention and US influence. For various, often tacti-
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cal reasons, the Northern giant usually proceeded with considerable self-
restraint. The confusion, internal disagreements, and coordination prob-
lems that frequently prevailed among the variety of US actors and agen-
cies has posed further obstacles to effective intervention. 
During the Cold War, the coincidence in preferences between the 
Northern superpower and the powerful elites of its Southern allies made 
it difficult to perceive these limits of US influence. For instance, many 
militaries did what the US wanted, especially by fighting the radical left.1 
But they did not do this because the US wanted it. Instead, they mainly 
acted out of their own initiative and would, arguably, have acted in this 
way even without US involvement. Thus, they did not act in order to 
fulfill US desires; they shared the same preferences, given their own 
fundamental interests and orientations. 
Moreover, as the global influence of the United States decreased, 
most noticeably with Vietnam and Watergate, the Northern superpower 
had ever less impact on political regime developments in Latin America. 
After failing to suppress the Cuban Revolution, the US also had great 
difficulty in its persistent, yet constrained efforts to remove the Nicara-
guan Sandinistas from power. Military influence only “worked” in micro-
states such as Grenada or in the thoroughly penetrated client state of 
Panama. While the end of the Cold War and the emergence of unipolari-
ty seemed to boost US influence in the 1990s, bring market reform, and 
help consolidate liberal, pluralist democracy in Latin America,2 the limits 
of US influence soon came to the fore again with the unprecedented 
advance of left-wing forces in the region. 
The example of, and ample support from, populist Hugo Chávez 
fueled the proliferation of semi-authoritarian regimes that were critical of 
US “imperialism.” Although this coordinated defiance elicited grave 
concerns in Washington, US linkage and leverage proved incapable of 
forestalling it and US foreign policy was unable to reverse it. Even politi-
cally weak and economically dependent Latin American countries such as 
Bolivia and Ecuador (despite dollarization) demonstrated a surprising 
degree of political autonomy. The limits of US influence became obvious 
in Venezuela. Hyperinflation, scarcities, repression, and crime are push-
ing the country toward collapse, but Washington has been powerless and 
mostly confined to watching this catastrophe from the sidelines. 

1  The reformist military regimes of Panama (1968–1981) and Peru (1968–1975) 
pursued a much more autonomous course; interestingly, the US had little lever-
age, as evident in Peru’s purchase of military hardware from the USSR. 
2  Weyland (2014: 177–182) recently documented the limits of US influence on 
the “third wave of democratization” in Latin America. 
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As the US, despite all its linkage and leverage, could not prevent the 
strangulation of democracy and the installation of (unfairly) competitive 
authoritarianism in Venezuela, Nicaragua, Bolivia, and Ecuador, it was 
also unable to do much to strengthen democracy elsewhere in the region. 
The most striking failure occurred in Haiti, where substantial foreign aid 
and diplomatic pressure did not succeed in bringing the installation of 
the basic mechanisms of democracy. This weak state simply suspended 
and postponed elections, sometimes for years. As the US lacks the “des-
potic power” to impose its regime preferences on contestatory left gov-
ernments, its arsenal of economic resources, political influence, and 
normative appeal cannot construct the “infrastructural power” (cf. Mann 
1984) either that would be required to pull Haiti out of its problems. 
As these recent experiences suggest, US influence in Latin America 
is surprisingly limited. This superpower faces significant obstacles in 
using its clout and preponderance to shape regime developments on the 
Southern continent. For better or for worse, Latin American countries 
have acquired a great deal of political autonomy. The fate of democracy 
and authoritarianism in the region is quite independent from Washing-
ton’s desires, especially specific foreign policy initiatives. 
Before this analysis can proceed, some conceptual clarifications are 
in order. Because this article examines US actions and their impacts, it 
does not define power and influence via a “basic force model,” but in-
stead employs a “force activation model” (March 1966; Keohane 1984: 
chaps. 2–3). Accordingly, power is understood as “the capacity to assert 
one’s will in a social relationship even against resistance, regardless of the 
source on which this capacity rests” (Weber 1972: 28). Influence, by 
contrast, denotes a weaker mechanism, which produces only a certain 
likelihood of compliance; moreover, influence lacks the capacity to break 
resistance and, therefore, tries to avoid direct conflict by employing in-
centives, persuasion, and nudging. Hegemony, on the other hand, is a 
stronger, more lasting mechanism than mere power. Drawing heft from 
its persistence, it reliably guarantees compliance and discourages the 
weaker partner from offering resistance in the first place.3 However, 
hegemony does not exclude cautious non-conformity on unessential 
issues (see Williams, Lobell, and Jesse 2012); thus, it is weaker than 
“rule” (Weber 1972: 28), which seeks to enforce strict compliance and, in 
relations between states, approximates imperialism. 

3  Lake’s (2009) “hierarchy” is a consolidated, institutionalized form of hegemo-
ny. 
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A relational notion of power and influence is crucial for investigat-
ing US foreign policy and its regime effects. However, by stipulating as 
the crucial test whether the stronger partner manages to “assert [its] will 
in a social relationship” (Weber 1972: 28), it raises the difficult issue of 
how to identify the stronger side’s true interests. When a supposedly 
hegemonic country does not push a weak state very hard, does it simply 
have limited goals, or does it anticipate resistance or costs and therefore 
back off – thus demonstrating the actual limits of its power? It is difficult 
to ascertain an actor’s true interests, given the strong incentives for dis-
simulation; bargaining tactics such as deception, bluffing, and sugar-
coating are common. Therefore, wherever possible, the following analy-
sis relies on internal documents that report frank statements by and 
discussions among leading policy-makers, or historical analyses of such 
materials. Given the time frame for the declassification of diplomatic 
documents, this methodological concern makes it useful to extend the 
study to older cases of US involvement in Latin America. After all, re-
cent events that understandably draw the most acute interest are still 
shrouded in considerable secrecy. 
This historical approach is also important for uncovering the broad-
er tendencies and overall trend of US involvement in Latin American 
regime developments, rather than attaching excessive importance to 
recent conjunctures. A longer time frame also helps by increasing the 
number of cases under investigation. Given continuing disagreements 
over case selection, the analysis does not single out a few instances of 
regime change in Latin America, which may be (regarded as) unrepre-
sentative. Instead, I discuss the most high-profile cases occurring from 
1960 onward. Of course, the down-side of this “medium-N” analysis is 
that space constraints preclude detailed, thorough process-tracing based 
on primary research. As many scholars have already conducted single-
case studies, the present article offers some balance by taking the oppo-
site position in the unavoidable trade-off between breadth and depth. 
With these goals in mind, I first examine the historical evidence. 
The next two sections discuss the reduction of US clout during the past 
century and its surprisingly low level in the new millennium, respectively. 
The fourth section then presents the main reasons for the limited influ-
ence of the Northern superpower, before the conclusion draws some 
broader inferences. 
 
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There is no question that the United States engaged in unbridled imperi-
alism from 1904 to 1934, especially in Mexico, Central America, and the 
Caribbean. With the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, the 
US appointed itself as the “policeman” of the Western Hemisphere. 
Accordingly, perceived misdeeds or offenses by a Latin American gov-
ernment prompted numerous interventions (Schoultz 1998: chaps. 8–11; 
Smith 2013: 34–39, 52–61). Interestingly, while the Northern hegemon 
frequently violated national sovereignty with military force, even then it 
mostly failed to achieve its long-term goals. Rather than implanting polit-
ical stability and liberal rule in its client states, the US mostly left behind 
repressive dictatorships or civil wars. In a pattern repeated less drastically 
in contemporary Haiti, state-building and the forceful installation of 
constitutional order rarely worked. Foreign military might did not func-
tion as an effective tool for domestic political reconstruction. Thus, even 
at the height of its imperialism, the US did not manage to control regime 
outcomes, even in countries under its military control. 
Moreover, open US imperialism soon came to an end. Persistent 
diplomatic protests from Latin America, led by Chile, Mexico, and Uru-
guay, induced the US – which sees itself as a rule-abiding nation – to 
promise respect for national sovereignty and the end of military interven-
tions. Also, the Great Depression absorbed US attention and made cost-
ly foreign involvement inadvisable. Consequently, in 1934, President 
Franklin Roosevelt foreswore the imperialistic posture and inaugurated a 
“Good Neighbor Policy.” While the US remained involved in Latin 
America in various ways, this policy change did have a significant impact. 
Since 1934, the Northern superpower has rarely intervened in Latin 
America with its own military force. The only sitting government evicted 
through a direct US invasion was General Noriega’s dictatorship in Pan-
ama in 1989. In the Dominican Republic in 1965, the US intervened in 
an open civil war, and in Grenada in 1983, President Ronald Reagan 
toppled a new leader immediately after a bloody internal coup. Thus, 
most of the time during the last eight decades, the US has refrained from 
applying the most powerful tool that great powers have at their disposal.  
Of course, over many decades the US could count on the prefer-
ence alignment and close connections it had established with Latin 
American militaries. The US did not need to send in the Marines because 
the armed forces of the region would do the “dirty work” themselves. 
These affinities were strongest during the Cold War, especially after the 
  The Promotion of Regime Change in Latin America 141 

Cuban Revolution, when Washington and many Latin American generals 
and other elites coincided in perceiving a serious threat of Communism 
(Brown 2017). Reacting to this specter, both the US and many powerful 
forces in the Southern continent embraced authoritarian rule as a – 
seemingly – necessary fortification of state power against the wave of 
radicalism inspired and fomented by Fidel Castro (Stepan 1971; Rouquié 
1987: chap. 8). 
While the US preached anti-Communism to Latin American elites, 
especially the intervention-prone armed forces, it was largely preaching 
to the converted. Generals, business people, and most politicians in the 
region had their own very strong reasons for combatting any attempt at 
radical transformation; their clear and powerful self-interests mandated 
determined efforts to maintain the established sociopolitical order. Ac-
cordingly, anti-Communism had a long tradition inside the region, which 
preceded US sermons. For instance, while Washington promoted the 
National Security doctrine from the early 1960s onward, South American 
militaries had, years earlier, absorbed similar, albeit harsher and more 
authoritarian French teachings on “revolutionary war,” derived from 
France’s painful experiences in Vietnam and Algeria. As Argentine and 
Brazilian generals highlighted, they regarded these French lessons, which 
they immediately incorporated in their own training, as significantly more 
relevant, useful, and appropriate for their own sinister purposes (Fragoso 
1959; interview with former Argentine dictator Jorge Videla in Reato 
2012: 75–77, 80–84; see also Mazzei 2002; Martins Filho 2012). Thus, 
the anti-Communist convergence among the Northern superpower and 
its Southern allies was not the product of US influence, but resulted 
from an underlying coincidence of “given” interests and a shared percep-
tion of threats. 
Moreover, while this fundamental interest convergence induced the 
US to condone and support the imposition of dictatorships in many 
Latin American countries, it was not directly responsible for the over-
throwing of liberal democracy. Washington did not initiate and engineer 
the coups that proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s. Although the US 
criticized, harassed, and in some cases squeezed leftist and populist gov-
ernments and then approved and backed their eviction, American dip-
lomats and the CIA did not take the lead in these regime changes. In-
stead, domestic actors, especially military officers, held primary responsi-
bility: They organized and executed the overthrow of civilian rule out of 
their own initiative. Internal elites had strong reasons of their own to 
suppress left-leaning experiments. In particular, radical efforts to under-
mine military hierarchy and discipline or break the armed forces’ mo-
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nopoly over organized coercion ( via workers’ militias, for example) 
prompted a forceful backlash, as evident in the emblematic cases of 
Brazil in 1964 and Chile in 1973. Thus, the self-interest of the military as 
an institution was the decisive motive for these coups (Stepan 1971; 
Rouquié 1987: ch. 8). 
Interestingly, in both of these high-profile episodes, American dip-
lomats preferred an electoral solution to the crisis almost until the end 
(FRUS 1964-1968, vol. 31: 409; FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 21: 869). For 
instance, just days before the coup in Brazil, Ambassador Lincoln Gor-
don commented on “the hypothesis of […] proper presidential elections 
being held in October, 1965. This would still be the best outcome for 
Brazil and for the United States if it can happen” (FRUS 1964-1968, vol. 
31: 413; see also Smith 2015: 263, 265). Besides normative considera-
tions, pragmatic calculations also played a role. After all, US officials 
believed that in the next electoral contest, centrist or conservative politi-
cians with friendly relations to the Northern superpower would defeat 
the left-wing incumbents, whose reform efforts were provoking eco-
nomic crises and social turmoil and thus – the US felt – undermining 
their support. 
However, the US worried that left-leaning presidents would try to 
forestall impending electoral defeat with all means possible and forceful-
ly perpetuate themselves in power in order to impose their ideological 
project in non-democratic fashion. Consequently, greatly overestimating 
this risk, Washington endorsed and supported military preparations to 
counteract the threat of a left-wing power grab, if deemed necessary, by 
removing Presidents Goulart and Allende from office. But the US did 
not assemble the coup coalitions; domestic actors clearly took the initia-
tive. Pragmatic calculations again were crucial motives for the great cau-
tion and reserve with which US officials proceeded. After all, both in 
Brazil and Chile, it seemed for a long time that anti-governmental con-
spiracies had slim chances of success. Major military leaders, such as 
Army Chief of Staff Humberto Castelo Branco in Brazil and Army Head 
Augusto Pinochet in Chile, kept hesitating and joined the coup coalition 
only when the left-leaning governments seemed to subvert the military 
institution itself, thereby sealing their fate. According to the available 
evidence, US diplomats and CIA agents were not instrumental in win-
ning over these pivotal actors.4  

4  On Pinochet’s last-minute decision, see the well-researched account by Gonzá-
lez (2000: 286–292, 303–311, 317–321). 
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Instead, once rapidly worsening polarization and confrontation 
seemed to make a coup more likely, the US deliberately pulled back even 
more and limited its contacts with generals. Washington understood that 
direct involvement would hold an enormous risk of back-firing. No self-
respecting general wanted to look like a lackey of the Northern “hege-
mon” (see, e.g., Walters 1978: 382, 390–391, 396; Dulles 1978: 332, 345–
348, 377). Moreover, any revelation of US instigation would have played 
into the hands of the leftist or populist incumbents, who could have 
promoted anti-Americanism and nationalism and turned these senti-
ments into powerful weapons against the prospective coup-mongers 
(FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 21: 867–868, 876, 881–882, 892). 
In sum, the US did not mastermind the coup wave of the 1960s and 
1970s. Recent declassifications of documents indirectly corroborate this 
claim by not yielding evidence of US instigation. As the archives slowly 
open, “smoking guns” of direct US responsibility have not appeared; 
instead, exonerating evidence sometimes comes to light. For instance, his 
now available diaries show that General Vernon Walters was vacationing 
in Florida during the period when, according to Haslam’s (2005: 167, 
169, 182, 211, 219) interview-based claim, he was in Santiago helping to 
organize the 1973 coup against Salvador Allende (Lockhart 2014). 
Based on thorough archival research, historians and investigative 
journalists have highlighted the autonomy and initiative of Latin Ameri-
can coup-makers. Summarizing his painstaking investigation of Brazil’s 
military regime, including intensive access to leading decision-makers and 
ample confidential documentation, Elio Gaspari (2002: 102) concluded: 
“Not one Brazilian, civilian or military, participated in the ouster of João 
Goulart [in 1964] because the United States wanted that.” Similarly, 
historian Jonathan Brown’s in-depth archival studies found that “rather 
than Washington, it was the Brazilians themselves who set the agenda 
and the pace for the overthrow” of Goulart. “US diplomats resembled 
fans cheering for the team on the right, while [the Brazilian] players on 
the field actually determined the ultimate victors” (Brown 2017: 
chap. 10). 
With regard to the most-discussed coup in Latin America, the 1973 
ouster of Socialist Salvador Allende in Chile, historian Tanya Harmer’s 
(2011: 272) well-researched study found that “the United States did not 
manipulate or force its Chilean contacts to do anything that they did not 
want to.” Instead, the coup-makers expressed “extreme pride that they 
managed their own coup without the assistance of the USG [US gov-
ernment] or other nations.” Longstanding country specialists Simon 
Collier and William Sater concurred, after highlighting US efforts to 
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undermine the Chilean economy and back opposition groupings: “It may 
be doubted, however, whether the CIA made very much difference: sad 
as it is to have to say this, the real ‘destabilization’ of Chile was the work 
of Chileans” (Collier and Sater 1996: 355).  
Certainly, despite its limited direct involvement, the coup wave of 
the 1960s and 1970s broadly conformed to US preferences by fore-
stalling the “dreaded” spread of Communism. While Washington would 
have preferred much less repression – and in fact pushed for a return to 
liberal, democratic rule, such as in Brazil from 1964 onward (FRUS 
1964-1968, vol. 31: 459–460, 489–490, 493–494) – US foreign policy-
makers were relieved that their worst-case scenario had not come true. 
Thus, Washington achieved its main goals overall. But because exceed-
ingly powerful elites in Latin America had embraced the same goals and 
did all they could to promote them, this US “success” does not consti-
tute proof of effective influence or power. The US did not have to over-
come an interest conflict, not to mention the breaking of resistance that 
Weber’s above-cited definition mentions. 
More indicative of the real extent of US influence and power are in-
stances in which Washington faced leftist challengers but could not 
count on internal elites to end this defiance. Such cases arose because 
Latin American left-wingers learned from the ousters of their ideological 
brethren, beginning with the Guatemalan coup against President Jacobo 
Arbenz in 1954, in which the US did play a crucial indirect role (by out-
fitting Guatemalan exiles, but not using its own military force). After 
Arbenz’s overthrow, where radicals managed to effect a revolutionary 
takeover of power and therefore had a fairly free hand in domestic poli-
tics, as in Cuba (1959) and Nicaragua (1979), these successful revolution-
aries quickly destroyed the remnants of the old-regime military and re-
built the armed forces from scratch to ensure their total loyalty to the 
new leadership; with this purpose in mind, Fidel Castro put his brother 
Raúl in charge in Cuba. These savvy moves did much to protect revolu-
tionary experiments from the wrath of the US and its local allies. Because 
the Northern superpower saw a direct military invasion as too costly and 
instead confined itself to efforts at “destabilization” (Stodden and Weiss 
2017), Castro managed to turn Cuba into an outpost of Communism 
right under the nose of the US (Brown 2017), and the Nicaraguan Sandi-
nistas survived the US’s wrath throughout the 1980s. The USSR’s securi-
ty umbrella long served as a crucial deterrent against an invasion of Cu-
ba, and the recent trauma of Vietnam placed an insurmountable domes-
tic constraint on President Reagan. 
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Even more clearly than Cuba’s longstanding defiance, the Nicaragu-
an case shows the limitations of US influence (see, in general terms, 
Pickering and Peceny 2006: 554–555).5 Although years of economic 
sanctions and constant paramilitary harassment eventually contributed 
strongly to the Sandinistas’ electoral defeat in 1990 (Booth 1995), it is 
remarkable how long this poor, small, and weak country, surrounded by 
hostile neighbors and facing an inveterate Cold Warrior in the White 
House, managed to hold out. In the end, the US “won” – but not as 
quickly and easily as great power theories would predict for the super-
power’s immediate “backyard.” In the imagery of Aesop’s fable, the 
massive lion found it surprisingly difficult to defeat the little mouse. 
The 1990s saw a particularly close alignment between the US and 
most of Latin America, for two principal reasons. First, the region-wide 
debt crisis forced a wave of neoliberal adjustment and market reform, 
which induced the Southern neighbors to revamp or dismantle their 
nationalist, protectionist, and state-interventionist development models. 
By opening up to the global economy, they embraced – to a greater or 
lesser extent – the free-market doctrines held dear by the United States. 
Moreover, trade, investment, and other exchanges with the US increased, 
limiting Latin America’s room for political maneuvering. 
Second, from the late 1970s onward, the third wave of democratiza-
tion had spread civilian competitive rule across the region, in the liberal-
pluralist version preferred by the US This groundswell of regime change 
made Washington’s promotion of democracy – its self-proclaimed mis-
sion (Smith 1994) in the absence of perceived threats from a rival great 
power – much easier. Rather than having to push obstreperous dictators 
to improve their human rights record and relinquish power, the US 
could now concentrate on helping to preserve democracy, as it did suc-
cessfully in Guatemala in 1993 and in Paraguay in 1996. Deterring 
threats is easier than actively promoting change; and in this defensive 
effort, the US could enlist the regional solidarity among elected presi-
dents and thus share responsibility. Moreover, there was considerable 
synergy between economic and political liberalization. The increased 
trade and investment resulting from neoliberal reform exposed Latin 
American countries to potential sanctions, which the inter-American 
community could use to forestall or reverse extraconstitutional interrup-
tions of democracy, as it did with some (albeit limited) success after 
Alberto Fujimori’s self-coup in Peru in 1992 (Boniface 2007: 41, 50, 57). 

5  In this article, Peceny seems to qualify the stronger claims about US influence 
and the success of forceful democracy promotion that his earlier book ad-
vanced (Peceny 1999: 184, 195–196, 206–213). 
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Yet, while the region-wide turn to market reform and liberal democ-
racy was in line with US preferences and enhanced Washington’s influ-
ence for a while, the Northern superpower’s clout remained limited. US 
pressures contributed to change in countries with reasonably firm eco-
nomic and political institutions, which could be reshaped and then per-
sisted in this transformed state thereafter. Accordingly, threats of sanc-
tions from the US and its Latin American allies forced President Fu-
jimori to back off from his initial plan to impose an open autocracy. 
Instead, he felt compelled to convoke a constituent assembly, which then 
restored presidential and Congressional elections as well. 
Although these US-led pressures brought back the formal institu-
tions of democracy, which Peru thereafter followed by holding elections 
on schedule, they were, however, insufficient to guarantee the fairness of 
these contests and prevent para-constitutional manipulations, such as the 
permission for Fujimori’s second consecutive reelection granted by a 
government-controlled Constitutional Court. Behind the façade of com-
petitive civilian rule, Fujimori and his aides continued to exert power in 
non-democratic ways, especially through a massive scheme of simply 
buying political support with bribes (Carrión 2006). 
The case of Haiti offers even more striking evidence for the limited 
effectiveness of US influence. The leaders of the coup against elected 
president Jean-Bertrand Aristide (1991) held out against strong pressures 
for quite a while; their ragtag thugs even succeeded in making a US naval 
task force back off in 1993. Only the imminent threat of a US invasion 
forced the Haitian coup-maker out and resulted in Aristide’s return to 
office in 1994. However, given the tremendous weakness of Haiti’s polit-
ical institutions, this success did not bring the functioning democracy 
that the US intended to install. Instead, the country experienced massive 
electoral manipulation, open fraud, intense inter-branch conflict, and 
endemic political violence (Peceny 1999: 164–169; Gros 2011; Buss 
2015). As in Peru, the restoration of democracy’s parchment institutions 
remained a superficial success; the reality of politics continued to be 
rather undemocratic. 
Even worse, Haitian politics took a further downturn in recent 
years. Ongoing institutional decay and deepening distrust made it ever 
harder to follow the formal procedures of democracy. Congressional and 
presidential elections were postponed, sometimes for years. The US kept 
pushing for compliance with the political calendar, but often in vain. 
When a country’s institutional infrastructure crumbles and melts away, 
external pressures lack an effective target and cannot make much differ-
ence. Where domestic actors lack real authority and control, foreign 
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actors with all their enormous clout are practically powerless. Given 
internal anomie, no external force can impose order – unless they literally 
take over the failing state. Yet the disappointing experiences of US impe-
rialism during the first third of the twentieth century and of many na-
tion-building efforts thereafter suggest that even such a re-colonization 
would not be successful in the medium and long run. Thus, the utter 
weakness of domestic institutions practically disarms overwhelming 
foreign power. 
7KH:HDNQHVVRI86,QIOXHQFHLQWKH7ZHQW\
)LUVW&HQWXU\
If the Haitian case demonstrates the limits of predominant power, in-
cluding military force, then the rise of a contestatory left in a whole 
group of Latin American countries in the new millennium shows the 
limited impact of economic, political, and cultural linkages. In their com-
prehensive study of competitive authoritarianism, Levitsky and Way 
(2010) argued that extensive connections to Western democracies induce 
nondemocratic rulers to move toward growing respect for the formal 
rules of democracy that their constitutions enshrine. In this view, eco-
nomic incentives, political appeals, and cultural attractions sooner or 
later turn the façade of democracy into a reality and guarantee free and 
fair elections conducted in a context of liberal safeguards and pluralistic 
debate. This reasoning should imply that strong linkages to the West also 
ensure the preservation of democracy by inducing political actors, espe-
cially presidents, to comply with the formal rules of democracy and their 
spirit. 
Contrary to these plausible expectations, however, the last two dec-
ades have seen a surprising turn away from liberal, pluralist democracy in 
several Latin American countries (Lehoucq 2008; Brewer-Carías 2010; 
Levitsky and Loxton 2013; Weyland 2013; De la Torre 2014), even 
though these nations have maintained extensive linkages with the US and 
the remainder of the democratic West. The protagonist of this push 
toward competitive authoritarianism was Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, a 
country with a multitude of close connections to the US. These compre-
hensive linkages rest on a firm, longstanding material foundation, namely 
large-scale oil exports to the Northern powerhouse that are crucial for 
Venezuela’s fiscal sustenance. Given the special characteristics of Vene-
zuela’s “heavy” petroleum, these economic flows entailed high depend-
ence. Whereas US refineries were well-suited for this crude, new custom-
ers would face major adjustment problems. Thus, Venezuela’s reliance 
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on the US market proved difficult to diminish; the strenuous diversifica-
tion efforts of “anti-imperialist” Chávez achieved only limited success. 
Venezuela’s state-owned oil company also held substantial investments 
in the US, especially a distribution network via Citgo. In principle, the 
Northern superpower could hold these assets hostage to retaliate against 
its populist adversary. 
For all of these reasons, Chávez seemed to have little room to ma-
neuver when he took power in 1999. Earlier rounds of market reform 
appeared to restrict his latitude in economic policy-making, and these 
economic constraints, combined with Venezuela’s wide-ranging political 
and cultural linkages to the US, seemed to secure liberal democracy. 
However, contrary to these expectations derived from Levitsky and 
Way’s (2010) theory, the new president immediately started to concen-
trate power, undermine checks and balances, and establish political he-
gemony (Brewer-Carías 2010). As opposition forces saw few options for 
responding to this paralegal march toward authoritarian rule, they resort-
ed to open contention, but ended up losing battle after battle. Given the 
heterogeneity and fragmentation of his opponents and the intense mobi-
lization of his core supporters, Chávez even survived a coup attempt in 
April 2002, which ended up discrediting his enemies and allowed the 
president to intensify his concentration of power. As the populist leader 
increasingly harassed and persecuted opposition forces and cemented his 
political predominance through the boundless use of state resources, 
which were swelled from 2003 onward by the global commodities boom, 
he managed to strangle democracy from the inside and establish a com-
petitive authoritarian regime. Once he had consolidated power, he also 
radicalized his economic policies, proclaiming his commitment to “so-
cialism” and initiating an expropriation spree directed primarily at private 
companies from the West (comprehensive analysis in Corrales and Pen-
fold 2010). 
The US was aghast at this turn of events, which Chávez accompa-
nied with acerbic “anti-imperialist” rhetoric and a determined effort to 
construct an anti-hegemonic coalition of leftwing governments in Latin 
America, including the US’s nemesis, Communist Cuba. Although con-
cern in Washington ran high in the first few years of the new millenni-
um, the US proved incapable of exerting any effective influence. The 
longstanding network of ample linkages clearly failed to deter Chávez’s 
determined reversal of prior market reforms and his suffocation of de-
mocracy. As part of their programs to support civil society across the 
globe, US agencies subsidized and supported interest associations and 
NGOs that opposed the power concentration in Venezuela (Encar-
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nación 2002); but these forces failed to restrain the populist leader or 
bring about his downfall. Despite suspicions, there is no clear evidence 
of direct US involvement in the 2002 coup attempt. Of course, if Wash-
ington had participated, the striking failure of this haphazard initiative 
would be another example of the superpower’s limited influence. 
Once Chávez had survived the coup attempt and had used bureau-
cratic foot-dragging, massive government spending, and deliberate intim-
idation to emerge unscathed from a recall referendum, he sat firmly in 
the saddle of power. Consequently, the US concluded that it lacked any 
real means for influencing economic and political developments in Ven-
ezuela. Indeed, open US involvement was bound to backfire because 
nationalism and anti-Americanism were among Chávez’s favorite in-
struments for maintaining his mass support. Thus, within a few short 
years, the Venezuelan leader managed to disarm the linkages and lever-
age that the Northern superpower seemed to wield over this highly de-
pendent country. The supposed hegemon was revealed as a paper tiger. 
In fact, although Venezuela is currently suffering a multi-faceted melt-
down, the US can do little more than watch from the sidelines as the 
entrenched leadership clings to power and systematically prevents the 
opposition from making headway toward ending the crisis. 
Not only was the US incapable of forestalling Venezuela’s descent 
into populist authoritarianism, but Chávez inspired several other leaders 
in Latin America to follow his script by concentrating power and hollow-
ing out democracy (De la Torre 2017). Once again, the Washington 
proved powerless to prevent the proliferation of contestatory leftism and 
moves toward non-democratic rule in its own sphere of influence. Just 
like Chávez, Evo Morales in Bolivia (2006–present) and Rafael Correa in 
Ecuador (2007–2017) convoked constituent assemblies, used them to 
expand their presidential powers, pushed with all means for political 
hegemony, attacked the opposition, and stifled independent news media 
(Lehoucq 2008; De la Torre 2014; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). In more 
blatantly extra-legal ways, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua forced through his 
reelection, engineered his party’s total predominance, and dismantled the 
opposition. Co-governing with his wife, whom he managed to have 
elected as vice-president, he continued to cement his hegemony (Salinas 
2017). 
As in Venezuela, this strangulation of democracy happened in coun-
tries that maintained dense linkages with the US and were highly de-
pendent on the West. For instance, Bolivia has long benefited from vo-
luminous foreign aid; Ecuador renounced monetary sovereignty and tied 
itself to the US through dollarization in 2000; and Nicaragua signed a 
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regional free trade agreement with the Washington right before Ortega 
returned to power. But all these forms of linkage and the resulting US 
leverage were not enough to prevent those presidents from undermining 
liberal, pluralist democracy and from moving toward authoritarian rule. 
At the same time, Morales and Correa also abandoned “neoliberalism” 
and embraced economic nationalism and heavy state-interventionism; 
indeed, Bolivia enacted a number of nationalizations à la Chávez. Strik-
ingly, even countries that were significantly smaller, weaker, and more 
dependent than Venezuela managed to move in economic and political 
directions that the global superpower clearly disliked. However, the US 
was unable to respond effectively as the anti-Americanism fomented by 
these leftwing leaders hindered any effective pressure. 
The only instance in which a similar effort to follow Chávez’s popu-
list script was stopped occurred in 2009 in Honduras. There, elitist con-
servative Manuel Zelaya unexpectedly morphed into a leftist populist 
and, attracted in part by Venezuelan oil subsidies, joined Chávez’s re-
gional alliance. When Zelaya started pushing for a constituent assembly 
toward the end of his presidential term, the opposition in Congress, the 
courts, and much of civil society, including his own former party friends, 
foresaw the specter of a move toward populist authoritarianism. They 
used their own electoral legitimacy and institutional bastions for persis-
tent efforts to block Zelaya’s political offensive. The president did not 
give up, however, disregarding multiple court orders and trying to take 
control of the military to enforce his will. As a last resort, the Supreme 
Court asked the armed forces to depose the president, whom they un-
constitutionally evicted from the country (Ruhl 2010; Taylor-Robinson 
and Ura 2012: 114–119). While it is not fully clear what Zelaya’s exact 
intentions were; and while his low support makes it doubtful that he 
could have achieved his goals, the opposition firmly believed that this 
drastic step was required to prevent the self-perpetuation of this populist 
leader. About half of Honduras’ citizenry and civil society shared this 
view and supported the pushy president’s ouster (Taylor-Robinson and 
Ura 2012: 117). 
Was the US involved in Zelaya’s overthrow? The available evidence 
suggests that Honduran political forces made all the crucial decisions in 
this drama.6 In particular, there is no indication that US diplomats or 
CIA agents instigated domestic opposition forces to move against their 

6  Even critics such as Main (2010: 15–16) acknowledge that “no evidence has yet 
emerged of direct US involvement in the coup.” Note that the “yet” in this 
quote reveals an “automatic” belief in US involvement that the present analysis 
critically examines. 
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wayward president.7 Internal elites had their own powerful reasons to 
worry about Zelaya’s surprising ideological mutation. Given Zelaya’s 
limited chances of success, they over-reacted and panicked at the sight of 
their president following in Chávez’s footsteps. Washington was dis-
pleased at this prospect as well, but this preference does not imply that 
the US acted on it, especially not in a leading role. Because Zelaya was 
bound to turn any evidence of US involvement to his advantage, the 
Northern superpower seems to have stayed on the sidelines in this deep-
ening crisis. 
When the coup forced the US to take a position, the Obama admin-
istration again refrained from taking the lead. After regional mediation 
efforts failed, Washington played for time, hoping that the new presiden-
tial elections scheduled for November 2009 would resolve the Honduran 
crisis. This outcome eventually prevailed, but mainly by default rather 
than due to active influence by the United States. Thus, Washington 
assumed no guiding role in the unfolding and dissipation of this crisis, 
which simply faded from international attention. 
In sum, the US, with all its arsenal of economic, political, and mili-
tary resources, proved unable to prevent the turn toward the contestato-
ry left in several Latin American countries. For the first time ever, the 
supposed “hegemon” faced a coordinated grouping of nations that pur-
sued a counter-hegemonic, anti-imperialist course. Besides the internal 
dismantling of market reforms and the suffocation of democracy, this 
left-populist club, organized in the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of 
Our America (ALBA), established and tightened relations with interna-
tional adversaries of the hemispheric superpower , such as China, Russia, 
and even Iran under Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, which Washington had 
condemned as a rogue regime. Although the US bristled at these interna-
tional alliances and regarded the connection to Iran as a worrisome 
provocation, it found no way of responding effectively and restoring 
control over its direct sphere of influence. 
After all, with his generous petro-diplomacy, ALBA leader Chávez 
garnered support from small and micro-states in the region and thus 
commanded enough strength in the Organization of American States to 

7  WikiLeaks unearthed no evidence of US instigation. On the contrary, as the 
crisis heated up in mid-June 2009, Ambassador Hugo Llorens counseled the 
Honduran military against any intervention (<www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables 
/09TEGUCIGALPA465_a.html>); and he advised Congress right before the 
coup not to remove Zelaya from office (<www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/ 
09TEGUCIGALPA501_a.html>). On the ethics and professionalism of using 
WikiLeaks documents for scholarly research, see Michael (2015: 178–182). 
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block pressures from the US and its Latin American allies. Moreover, 
even nations averse to Chávez’s contentious rhetoric, especially Brazil, 
found it tactically useful to cooperate with this anti-American populist. 
In this way, President Lula da Silva could claim the role of a moderating 
force and enhance his leadership in South America. Therefore, President 
George W. Bush found little backing for his initially confrontational 
stance against the Venezuelan leftist. Having failed in this way, Bush 
eventually backed off and his Democratic successor disengaged even 
more. As these moves toward prudence indicated, the US resigned itself 
to a situation that clearly violated its interests, but that it had no real 
capacity to change. Even in its own “backyard,” the influence of the 
global superpower proved distinctly limited. The US could not forestall 
turns toward left-populist authoritarianism and assert its preference for 
liberal, pluralist democracy. 
While Washington was unable to thwart harmful activities by con-
testatory governments, it proved more successful in defending allies that 
faced serious challenges, especially politically motivated violence. Mas-
sive economic and military support helped Colombia combat long-
festering guerrilla insurgencies with increasing effectiveness. With US 
encouragement and backing, Bogotá reestablished control over large 
swaths of the national territory and thus laid the groundwork for pre-
serving the institutions of liberal, pluralist democracy from left-wing 
insurgents and from hardcore right-wingers.  
Colombia’s President Álvaro Uribe (2002–2010) concentrated pow-
er and tried to run roughshod over checks and balances (Kline 2009: 
chap. 8), but the country’s civil society and institutional framework, es-
pecially the autonomous Constitutional Court, proved resilient and con-
tained these tendencies toward illiberalism. In particular, they succeeded 
in blocking Uribe’s attempt to run for a second consecutive reelection, 
which would have allowed the incumbent to prolong and enhance his 
domineering leadership. After Uribe had to hand over power, Colom-
bia’s democracy gradually recovered and gained greater vibrancy and 
higher quality (Mayka 2016; Taylor 2016). Thus, through its sustained 
support for a struggling and rather defective democracy, the US helped 
to prevent further deterioration and to bring about an eventual turna-
round. 
 
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This wide-ranging assessment of US efforts to shape regime develop-
ments in its direct sphere of influence has yielded the unexpected con-
clusion that, since 1934, the Northern superpower has mostly played a 
fairly restrained role, has found it difficult to achieve its goals, and has 
seen its influence diminish significantly over time. For decades, the US 
has not exerted hegemony, especially not over Mexico and South Ameri-
ca. That is, Washington has not managed to guarantee compliance with 
its major expectations and exhortations, nor have Latin American coun-
tries refrained from offering resistance on crucial issues. Even in Central 
America, Washington has struggled to face down disagreement and chal-
lenges, as shown by the 11 years of revolutionary Sandinista rule (1979–
1990) and the determined push of reelected Daniel Ortega toward au-
thoritarianism (2006–present). It is noteworthy that the Northern super-
power cannot impose its will on such a small, dependent country. 
The limited influence of the US would be especially puzzling for a 
basic force model of power (cf. March 1966). After all, the global colos-
sus has an immeasurable military predominance over its Southern neigh-
bors, which it used freely from 1898 to 1934. However, this imperialism 
showed that armed attacks and invasions bring uncertain benefits and 
create a variety of domestic and international costs for their perpetrator. 
The strengthening of many Latin American states and the professionali-
zation of their militaries further increased these costs during the twenti-
eth century. Whereas countries racked by civil war and run with private 
armies could be taken over by a few thousand Marines, invading chavista 
Venezuela, for instance, would be an undertaking of completely different 
magnitude, carrying enormous risk. Moreover, with the de-legitimation 
of warfare in global – especially Western – public opinion, the open use 
of military force would nowadays elicit a powerful international backlash. 
US society would probably also oppose such adventures, especially after 
the debacle in Vietnam and the recent failures in Iraq. Consequently, 
since 1934 the US has employed military force only against targets in 
Latin America that lack the capacity for resistance, namely microstate 
Grenada and mini-state Panama. By contrast, despite his undisguised 
hostility toward the Sandinistas, even Ronald Reagan did not order the 
Marines to take over Nicaragua – the jungles of Central America looked 
too similar to those of Vietnam. 
Thus, because “basic force” has not proved decisive, it is crucial to 
adopt a force activation model. Although the US has overwhelming 
military capacity, it faces important domestic and international con-
straints that often hinder the effective use of this capacity. Military force 
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is a very blunt instrument that is not easy to employ for influencing po-
litical regime developments inside other countries. For instance, it would 
not be credible to threaten Haiti with armed action in order to ensure 
that elections are held on schedule. Even President Trump would not 
garner sufficient internal support and foreign impact if he were to use 
these kinds of tactics. In sum, the conditions for the US to activate its 
force are quite restrictive, and the political efficacy of force for shaping 
the fate of political regimes in Latin America is questionable. 
When the sword remains sheathed, other forms of pressure lack re-
liable means of enforcement. During the decades of the Cold War, the 
perceived common threat of Communism led many Latin American 
countries to huddle under the protective wings of the Northern super-
power, but even then they adopted this posture out of a convergence of 
interests, not due to Washington’s persuasion or pressure. Moreover, the 
end of the Cold War has encouraged Southern states to pursue their own 
national interests and political preferences with considerable independ-
ence. Accordingly, they have diversified their international economic and 
political linkages, which has allowed these nations, especially in South 
America, to counterbalance US efforts to exert leverage. The massive 
increase of their economic exchanges with China in the new millennium 
has further boosted this autonomy. 
Latin America’s new partners, starting with Europe and Japan, tend 
to embrace greater ideological pragmatism than the US; therefore, they 
do not promote economic principles and political regime preferences 
with the same zeal. Apart from the UK since the Margaret Thatcher era, 
these extra-hemispheric countries are not as committed to free-market 
liberalism; and because their party systems have long harbored important 
left-wing forces, they are less concerned about moves toward “socialism” 
and the concomitant deviations from the strict rules of liberal, pluralist 
democracy. Consequently, European pragmatism has for many years 
counterbalanced US pressures. This passive resistance first came to the 
fore in the Central American conflicts of the 1980s, when Europe’s con-
tinued economic and political cooperation with Sandinista Nicaragua 
helped to undermine the economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation 
efforts spearheaded by the Reagan administration. 
Given the striking economic predominance of the US in the West-
ern hemisphere, Washington’s pressures are more effective when Latin 
America suffers from serious economic problems, as they prevailed 
especially during the region-wide debt crisis of the 1980s and the subse-
quent adoption of market reforms. But even under those dire circum-
stances, external influence remained limited. The international financial 
  The Promotion of Regime Change in Latin America 155 

institutions (IFIs) that the US entrusted with taking the lead in structural 
adjustment and neoliberal change often found spotty compliance with 
their exhortations; even loan conditionality lacked reliable bite (Kahler 
1992; Vreeland 2003). 
The use of economic instruments for political goals faces even 
greater obstacles. Fear of economic sanctions and of plummeting inves-
tor confidence was certainly key in pushing President Fujimori to open 
up the authoritarian regime imposed with his self-coup of 1992 and to 
convoke elections, as mentioned above. But these liberalizing moves 
remained at the surface and did not transform the core of Fujimori’s 
regime, which most scholars classify as competitive authoritarianism 
(Carrión 2006; Levitsky and Loxton 2013). Fujimori and his top aides 
systematically distorted formally democratic procedures and guaranteed 
his continued domination through the unfair use of governmental re-
sources, tight control over the media, and systematic harassment of the 
opposition. Consequently, whereas Colombia’s democratic institutions 
blocked President Uribe’s quest for a second consecutive reelection, 
Fujimori did manage to engineer this undemocratic feat (but his corrup-
tion-ridden regime collapsed from within soon thereafter). In sum, while 
external economic pressures made a political difference in Peru, closer 
inspection reveals that these pressures affected regime form more than 
substance and failed to restore effective democracy. 
The legacies of early US interventions also hindered the exertion of 
influence in subsequent decades. After all, “the gringos” did act rather 
heavy-handedly during the first third of the twentieth century. Moreover, 
the US undertook a number of clumsy and ill-fated efforts thereafter, 
such as instigation of the overthrow of President Jacobo Arbenz in Gua-
temala in 1954, the Bay of Pigs fiasco in Cuba in 1961, and a host of 
covert actions in Chile during the 1960s and early 1970s, which were 
most disastrous in the immediate aftermath of Salvador Allende’s elec-
tion, when Chilean right-wingers with prior CIA connections made a 
rather harebrained attempt at a coup (Harmer 2012: 56–64). Because a 
broad spectrum of Latin Americans have condemned these “destabiliza-
tion” efforts (cf. Stodden and Weiss 2017) as violations of national sov-
ereignty and interference in internal affairs, the US has faced an increas-
ing cost for any further involvement, and the threshold at which Latin 
Americans declare US influence as illegitimate has fallen so much that 
even financial subsidies for NGOs can nowadays be lambasted as coup 
attempts. Accordingly, Venezuela’s Nicolás Maduro has used frequent 
“revelations” of foreign conspiracies as one of the last straws for shoring 
up his crisis-rocked regime. This desperate invention of alleged plots 
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appeals to a substrate of anti-Americanism that reflects widespread rejec-
tion of the well-known earlier instances of US imperialism. 
Washington noticed the growing resentment in Latin America dec-
ades ago and considered it in planning its efforts to influence regime 
developments in the region. For instance, the US did not provide ample 
subsidies to centrist and right-wing parties for Chile’s presidential elec-
tion of 1970, which Marxist Allende won, to President Nixon’s great 
consternation. One reason for this self-restraint was that the US and its 
West German allies had channeled millions of dollars to the Christian 
Democrats in 1964, and this external backing had caused a strong back-
lash (FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 21: 77, 86, 89, 94). Similarly, the US deliber-
ately avoided any direct participation in the conspiracies to oust Brazilian 
President Goulart in 1964 and Chile’s Allende in 1973 so that these in-
cumbents could not use leaked evidence of such involvement to whip up 
nationalism, discredit the coup plotters as lackeys of the hegemon, and in 
these ways safeguard their precarious position (FRUS 1964-1968, vol. 31: 
422, 427–428, 437; FRUS 1969-1976, vol. 21: 813–814, 867–868, 881–
884). Thus, Washington was fully aware of the risk that contacts with 
rebellious generals could inflame anti-American sentiment and prove 
counterproductive. Necessary caution confined the US to watching the 
denouement of high-stakes crises mostly from the sidelines. 
Subsequent experiences of US involvement, such as President 
Reagan’s incessant (though rather ineffectual) harassment of Sandinista 
Nicaragua, further intensified these nationalist sentiments in Latin Amer-
ica. Moreover, this anti-imperialism has found greater resonance because 
increasing linkages to extra-hemispheric nations have given Latin Ameri-
can countries autonomy and latitude. They can now afford to react in 
more allergic ways to any US effort to exert undue influence. The recent 
massive entry of China into the Western Hemisphere and the global 
commodities boom, which substantially loosened economic constraints, 
further boosted these anti-hegemonic tendencies. As a result, Washing-
ton has faced rather stringent constraints, which became evident in its 
powerlessness before the radical-populist left. As the superpower’s for-
mer sins exact a lasting political price, its influence has weakened sub-
stantially, even in its own sphere of interest. Force activation faces im-
portant obstacles. 
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An important line of recent scholarship argues that great powers can 
shape the selection and change of political regimes among weaker coun-
tries, especially in their sphere of influence (see, e.g., Boix 2011 and Nar-
izny 2012). In this vein, one branch of diffusion research has emphasized 
coercion as a mechanism that drives the spread of innovations. Wide-
ranging analyses have confirmed that the global rise and fall of hegemon-
ic powers is associated with corresponding waves of regime change. For 
instance, as Gunitsky (2017) has demonstrated, the defeat of autocratic 
powers in war and the victory of liberal-democratic states went hand in 
hand with the proliferation of democracy; by contrast, the economic 
recovery and geopolitical rise of Nazi Germany and Communist Russia 
was quickly followed by the spread of fascist and Communist regimes, 
respectively. Well-known cases such as the institution of democracy in 
US-occupied Germany and Japan after the Second World War provide 
further evidence for the great power theory. 
To assess these arguments, the present essay has examined US rela-
tions with Latin America. Given the striking superiority of the Northern 
superpower in economic, political, and military resources, this assess-
ment focuses on “most likely cases” for the great power theory. If over-
whelming power can indeed shape regime outcomes, then the Western 
Hemisphere should provide ample evidence. Indeed, Washington has 
long seen itself as the protagonist of liberal democracy in the world. This 
missionary zeal has prompted numerous US attempts at regime promo-
tion. The hegemonic theory expects these interventionist efforts to pro-
duce a good deal of success, especially in the superpower’s home region. 
However, my wide-ranging investigation of US–Latin American re-
lations casts doubts on the great power approach, especially the argu-
ments about coercion. While the US did engage in uninhibited imperial-
ism during the first third of the twentieth century, it has proceeded with 
considerable restraint since then. Moreover, Washington’s influence has 
only had a limited impact. Last not least, US clout has diminished signifi-
cantly over time. Nowadays, the superpower’s influence over regime 
development in Latin America does not run at a high level. 
Specifically, where the US employed military force, as in the circum-
Caribbean from 1898 to 1934, it rarely achieved the intended results. 
None of the countries invaded during those decades established a liberal 
regime, let alone democracy. Throughout the twentieth century, imposi-
tion only worked when it was used selectively to free tiny countries from 
brutal dictators, namely Grenada from coup-makers Bernard Coard and 
Hudson Austin in 1983 and Panama from kleptocrat Manuel Noriega in 
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1989. In those small states, US intervention did usher in successful tran-
sitions to democracy. 
During the Cold War, the US prioritized anti-Communism over the 
institution of liberal democracy and often encouraged and supported the 
installation of conservative dictatorships. This endorsement of a pre-
sumed lesser evil prevailed especially after the Cuban Revolution, until 
the mid-1970s (Brown 2017). Yet, in the imposition of these anti-
Communist autocracies, Washington’s role and impact were limited. 
After all, Latin America’s socioeconomic, political, and military elites had 
their own grave concerns about the danger of left-wing radicalism. 
Therefore, even without US instigation, these powerful sectors did every-
thing they could to forestall this perceived threat, which was highly sali-
ent after Castro’s takeover of power and subsequent radicalization; these 
fears were then revived in Central America after the Sandinista revolu-
tion in Nicaragua in 1979. Due to the strong affinities in threat percep-
tions and the fundamental coincidence of interests, status-quo defenders 
in Latin America, particularly the armed forces, took the lead in combat-
ing Communism. Because many professional militaries had powerful 
reasons of their own to squash leftist radicalism, the US did not need to 
push very hard. As Latin American elites were determined to act anyway 
and commanded the means to assert their interests, US influence was not 
crucial for the eventual outcome. 
However, on two occasions – namely, in Cuba and Nicaragua – 
revolutionaries managed to win power and, for the sake of self-
protection, destroyed the old regime’s military. In these cases, internal 
elites lacked the wherewithal to defend the established sociopolitical 
order. Where the US took the lead in trying to strangle leftist radicalism 
from the outside, success was strikingly limited. The Castro brothers 
survived the punitive measures imposed under 11 US administrations. 
Even the Sandinistas in weak Nicaragua, surrounded by enemies, held 
out for more than a decade against the US’s arsenal of hostility. Similarly, 
despite an economic collapse, the Chávez/Maduro regime in Venezuela 
has held out for almost two decades, using anti-American rhetoric as one 
of the few remaining weapons in its desperate efforts to cling to power. 
Even in its own “backyard,” therefore, the US has not managed to 
use its overwhelming capability advantage to successfully shape regime 
trajectories. After the failure in Vietnam, the supposed hegemon has 
become gun-shy and has rarely employed its military advantage. Other 
mechanisms, such as linkage and leverage, do not reliably produce the 
intended outcomes, as shown by the rise of populist leftism and the 
moves toward competitive authoritarianism in Venezuela, Nicaragua, 
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Ecuador, and Bolivia in the new millennium. Washington’s soft power 
has been foiled by the solidarity among Latin American presidents, who 
long acquiesced in the strangulation of democracy and in discriminatory 
attacks on the political opposition in neighboring countries, as the inef-
fectiveness of the Organization of American States in the Venezuelan 
crisis demonstrates (contra Pevehouse 2005). 
The predominance of negative results in a most-likely-case study 
constitutes a noteworthy finding that puts great-power and coercion 
arguments in perspective. While authoritarian or totalitarian great powers 
have no compunctions about using force and while non-democratic 
regimes can effectively be imposed with force, a liberal-democratic su-
perpower faces much greater constraints. Accountability to the citizenry 
restricts the use of military means; and coercive outside intervention is 
not particularly well-suited for installing democracy. After all, efforts to 
impose liberty can suffer from a self-contradiction and prompt a nation-
alist backlash that plays into the hands of non-democratic forces. 
Moreover, while it is tempting to attribute waves of democracy at 
the end of global confrontations to the promotional activities of victori-
ous liberal powers, domestic mechanisms may be at play. Mobilization 
for warfare tends to empower the lower strata and thus unleashes de-
mands for political participation, as was clear as far back as ancient Ath-
ens, 2500 years ago. Thus, hegemonic conflict can have important do-
mestic repercussions that do not result from great power push, as in 
Britain’s move toward universal suffrage at the end of the First World 
War. In many other cases, as in Eastern Europe after the First World 
War and in Africa after the end of the Cold War, countries adjust to the 
prevailing Zeitgeist and learn from the victory of democratic powers even 
without direct pressure. Thus, correlations between global power transi-
tions and the tides of democracy in the world do not need to be the 
result of active great power influence, let alone coercion – as Gunitsky 
(2017) acknowledged by invoking a variety of hard and soft causal mech-
anisms. 
Last but not least, there is a measurement issue. Great power and 
coercion arguments concentrate on demonstrating the direct and indirect 
impact that powerful countries seem to have exerted on regime devel-
opments elsewhere. In particular, they have highlighted that great powers 
managed to make a difference. While this is a valid result, there is anoth-
er way of looking at the issue, which is by asking how often and to what 
extent great powers achieved their goals. This higher standard is, by its 
nature, harder to reach. In many episodes in Latin America, the US made 
some difference, but did not achieve its goals, as noticed by Jimmy 
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Carter when pressuring South American dictatorships or by Bill Clinton 
when helping to restore the elected leader of Haiti. The most spectacular 
instance of a divergence between impact and goal achievement is, of 
course, revolutionary Cuba, where US pressure was effective, but only in 
terms of helping to radicalize the regime and to consolidate its long-
standing stranglehold over the island! Thus, even where great powers 
matter, they often do not get their way and can sometimes “shoot them-
selves in the foot.” 
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Limitaciones de la Influencia de los Estados Unidos: La 
Promoción del Cambio de Régimen en América Latina 
Resumen: Muchos investigadores asumen que, como superpotencia 
global, los Estados Unidos han tenido una gran influencia y un fuerte 
impacto sobre los cambios de régimen político en el mundo. El presente 
artículo hace una evaluación crítica de estos argumentos, concentrándose 
en el caso latinoamericano. Investigando la región dominada más 
directamente por los EUA, el artículo utiliza un diseño de “caso más 
probable.” Las experiencias de países como Brasil, Chile, Haití, Nica-
ragua y Venezuela muestran que, desde hace muchos años, la influencia 
de EUA ha sido relativamente limitada y que ha disminuido a lo largo del 
tiempo. La superpotencia del Norte se ha involucrado menos y ha tenido 
un menor impacto sobre los cambios de régimen que el que muchos 
observadores postulan, como demuestra el análisis de los golpes militares 
en Brasil en 1964 y en Chile en 1973. Además, naciones que han 
mantenido conexiones densas y extensas con los EUA, como por 
ejemplo Venezuela, han descendido hacia un “autoritarismo competiti-
vo,” mientras que un país como Haití, sobre el cual los EUA tienen un 
enorme poder de presión, ha fallado en el esfuerzo de establecer una 
democracia que funcione apropiadamente. En conclusión, aun en su 
esfera de influencia directa, el país más poderoso en el mundo contem-
poráneo parece enfrentar limitaciones en su capacidad de promover o 
prevenir cambios del régimen político. 
Palabras clave: América Latina, Estados Unidos, régimen político, 
democracia, superpotencia, promoción del cambio de régimen 
 
